A single object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We o¤er an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Paretooptimal in the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free mechanisms. These mechanisms form a one-parameter in…nite family; the Vickrey mechanism is the only Groves mechanism in that family.
Introduction
We revisit the problem of allocating a single valuable object to at most one of a number of agents when monetary transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. Valuations being private information, an incentive-compatible mechanism is needed. To avoid delicate assumptions on beliefs, we ask that this mechanism be strategy-proof. To guarantee feasibiIity, the sum of the transfers made to the agents should never be positive. This is the simplest of a variety of assignment problems that have received considerable attention in the literature. Most of the existing work focuses on assignment-optimal strategy-proof mechanisms. In our model, assignmentoptimality simply means that the object never remains unallocated and always goes to a maximal valuation agent. Under assumptions that cover our particular case, Holmström (1979) showed that the assignment-optimal strategy-proof mechanisms are precisely the famous Groves (1973) mechanisms. Green and La¤ont (1979) showed that all feasible Groves mechanisms waste money: the sum of transfers is (strictly) negative at some valuation pro…les.
Of course, both the assignment and the sum of transfers matter for Paretooptimality. Since relaxing the constraint of assignment-optimality obviously helps to reduce the amount of money wasted (leaving the object unallocated and performing no transfers is a strategy-proof and feasible mechanism that wastes no money), restricting attention to the Groves mechanisms is unwarranted. We should instead look for mechanisms that are (constrained) Pareto-optimal within the entire class of feasible strategy-proof mechanisms: not all them need be Groves mechanisms 1 . Nisan et al. (2007) show that all strategy-proof mechanisms for our problem have the following structure. Each agent faces a price that varies only with the other agents' valuations. If he reports a valuation below that price, he does not get the object but receives a transfer which depends upon the others' valuations. If he reports a valuation above the price, he receives the object plus the di¤erence between that transfer and the price of the object. This is a generalization of Holmström's (1979) characterization to mechanisms that need not be assignment-optimal.
Identifying the Pareto frontier of the class of feasible strategy-proof mechanisms, however, remains an open problem. The question is di¢ cult because feasibility imposes complex restrictions on the price and transfer functions in the Nisan et al. characterization. In the current paper we obtain partial results by restricting attention to the subclass of anonymous and envy-free mechanisms, for which the price and transfer functions turn out to be tractable. Notice that not all envy-free strategy-proof mechanisms are Groves: while no-envy forces an optimal assignment of the object whenever the latter is allocated (Svensson, 1983) , it does allow us to leave the object unallocated. We identify a one-parameter in…nite family of mechanisms -which we call the maxmed mechanisms-that are Pareto-optimal in the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envyfree mechanisms. We further prove that the maxmed mechanisms are the only individually rational and Pareto-optimal mechanisms within that class. The Vickrey (1961) mechanism is the only Groves maxmed mechanism; all others leave the object unallocated at some pro…le of valuations.
Our paper is related to two di¤erent lines of work. The …rst line studies envy-free strategy-proof mechanisms in various quasilinear assignment models; recent papers are Pápai (2003) , Svensson (2004), and Ohseto (2006) . The most important di¤erence with our work is that all these papers restrict attention to mechanisms that never leave an object unallocated, hence, since no-envy implies assignment optimality, to Groves mechanisms. In a model with several di¤erent valuable objects, Pápai (2003) proves that no envy-free Groves mechanism exists on the unrestricted domain of valuations and characterizes the Groves mechanisms that are envy-free on the domain of superadditive valuations. Svensson (2004) considers a model with n agents and n di¤erent objects where valuations may be negative but each agent must be assigned one object. He describes the Groves mechanisms that satisfy no-envy and two auxiliary conditions. Ohseto (2006) studies a model with n agents and m < n copies of the same object; val-uations may be negative, all copies must be assigned, and each agent may get at most one copy. He characterizes the family of envy-free Groves mechanisms.
The second line of work studies "optimal"strategy-proof assignment mechanisms, usually in a multi-object or multi-unit setting. The class of mechanisms under consideration as well as the optimality criterion vary.
Here again, most papers focus on Groves mechanisms. Guo and Conitzer (2009) and Moulin (2009) follow the worst-case approach: they minimize (slightly di¤erent measures of) the worst relative surplus loss. Guo and Conitzer (2010) assume that a prior on the preference pro…les is available and minimize the expected loss. Apt et al. (2008) describe the mechanisms whose total loss is undominated in the sense that no other mechanism in the reference class produces a smaller loss at all pro…les. Closer to our paper, Ohseto (2006) and Guo and Conitzer (2008) use the traditional criterion of (constrained) Pareto-optimality. In the paper already cited above, Ohseto (2006) describes the Pareto frontier of the class of envy-free Groves mechanisms. In a fairly general multi-object setting, Guo and Conitzer (2008) o¤er a set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for Pareto-optimality within the class of Groves mechanisms; they also provide algorithms which improve upon any given Groves mechanism and reach or approach the Pareto frontier.
Three recent papers look beyond the Groves mechanisms. In the same model as ours, Moulin (2010) studies the problem of minimizing the worst relative surplus loss within the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous, and q-fair mechanisms 2 , where q 3: He allows for non-Groves mechanisms but the solution he describes is a Groves mechanism. In the multi-copy, unit-demand model, de Clippel et al. (2011) propose a mechanism that is not assignment-optimal but guarantees a relative surplus loss of less than 20% when the number of agents tends to in…nity. Their mechanism never leaves more than one object unallocated and it assigns the remaining objects e¢ ciently. The paper most closely related to ours is Athanasiou (2011) . In the single-object model, Athanasiou provides a set of necessary and, under individual rationality, su¢ cient conditions for Pareto-optimality within the class of feasible, strategy-proof, and anonymous mechanisms. In the two-agent case, he shows that the maxmed mechanisms are Pareto-optimal but does not prove that they are the only ones. For more than two agents, he does not give any example of a mechanism satisfying his conditions for Pareto optimality.
Setup
One object is to be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. Each agent's valuation of the object is a nonnegative real number: a (valuation) pro…le is a vector v = (v 1 ; :::; v n ) 2 R 
A mechanism (a; t) is feasible if it is both a-feasible, i.e., P i2N a i (v) 1 for all v 2 R N + , and t-feasible, i.e.,
and any permutation on N , where the pro…le v is de…ned by ( v) 
+ and i; j 2 N: We stress that a feasible mechanism may leave the object unallocated at some pro…le (i.e., P i2N a i (v) = 0 may hold for some v 2 R N + ). Note also that anonymity is de…ned in utility terms.
We let M denote the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envyfree mechanisms. If (a; t); (a 
This paper provides an explicit description of the individually rational Pareto-optimal mechanisms in M.
Preliminaries and statement of the result
We begin by proving a number of properties of the mechanisms in M. This is the purpose of the following three lemmas. Let
Lemma 1. A mechanism (a; t) is strategy-proof and anonymous if and only if there exist two symmetric functions p : R
and
Proof. The proof is an easy modi…cation of the proof of the characterization of the strategy-proof mechanisms in Nisan et al. (2007) . We omit the details.
We call a pair of functions (p; g) 2 R (1) and (2) hold for all v 2 R N + and i 2 N; we say that the scheme (p; g) generates the mechanism (a; t): It is clear from (1) that the scheme generating a strategy-proof and anonymous mechanism is unique.
Conversely, because of (2), a scheme (p; g) generates not just one, but an entire family of strategy-proof and anonymous mechanisms. In view of (1), however, these mechanisms coincide at almost all pro…les. Moreover, they are all Pareto-equivalent since agent i is indi¤erent between (0; g(v i )) and
From the viewpoint of feasibility, a particularly useful mechanism is the lexicographic mechanism generated by (p; g), which we de…ne as follows: for
For any k 2 N and x = (x 1 ; :::; x k ) 2 R k ; we denote by max x the maximum of the numbers x 1 ; :::; x k : Lemma 2. Let (a; t) be a strategy-proof and anonymous mechanism and let (p; g) be the scheme generating it.
(
+ ; then (a; t) is Pareto-equivalent to an a-feasible, strategyproof and anonymous mechanism; in particular, the lexicographic mechanism generated by (p; g) is a-feasible.
Proof. Let (a; t) be a strategy-proof and anonymous mechanism and let (p; g) be the scheme that generates it.
Ad (i). We …rst prove the contraposition of the …rst sentence. Suppose there exists x = (x 1 ; :::; x n 1 ) 2 R n 1 + such that p(x) < max x and assume without loss of generality that max x = x 1 : Consider the valuation pro…le v = (x 1 ; x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n 1 ):
To check conditional a-optimality, let v = (v 1 ; :::; v n ) and suppose v i < v j : Contrary to the claim, suppose a i (v) = 1:
Ad (ii). In order to prove the …rst sentence in (ii), assume p(x) > max x for all x 2 R n 1 + : Contrary to the claim, suppose there exists v 2 R N + and two distinct agents i; j 2 N such that
In order to prove the second sentence in (ii), assume p(x) max x for all x 2 R n 1 + and let (a L ; t L ) be the lexicographic mechanism generated by (p; g): Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists v 2 R N + and two distinct agents i; j 2 N such that i < j and a
Statement (i) in Lemma 2 is Proposition 1 in Athanasiou (2011) . His direct proof does not exploit Nisan et al.'s characterization of the strategy-proof mechanisms.
Lemma 3. Let (a; t) 2 M and let (p; g) be the scheme generating (a; t): Then there exists a function g 0 :
Proof. We show that g(x) varies only with max x: Speci…cally, let x = (x 1 ; :::; x n 1 ) and assume, without loss of generality, that max x = x 1 : We prove that for each i = 2; :::; n 1 and each
Fix i 2 f2; :::; n 1g ; say, i = 2; and let x 0 2
x 1 : Suppose, by way of contradiction, that g(x 1 ; x 0 2 ; x 3 ; :::; x n 1 ) 6 = g(x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ; :::; x n 1 ): Let v = (v 1 ; :::; v n ) = (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 0 2 ; x 3 ; :::; x n 1 ):
If a 2 (v) = 1 and a 3 (v) = 0; then by conditional a-optimality (which holds by Lemma 2 (i))
2 ; x 3 ; :::; x n 1 )) = (0; g(x 1 ; x 0 2 ; x 3 ; :::; x n 1 )) while (a 3 (v); t 3 (v)) = (0; g(v 3 )) = (0; g(x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ; :::; x n 1 )): Then g(v 1 ) 6 = g (v 3 ) and either 1 envies 3 or 3 envies 1.
If a 2 (v) = 0 and a 3 (v) = 1; then by conditional a-optimality
2 ; x 3 ; :::; x n 1 )) = (0; g(x 2 ; x 1 ; x 3 ; :::; x n 1 )) = (0; g(x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ; :::; x n 1 )); where the last inequality holds by symmetry of g: On the other hand, (a 2 (v); t 2 (v)) = (0; g(v 2 )) = (0; g(x 1 ; x 0 2 ; x 3 ; :::; x n 1 )): Then g(v 1 ) 6 = g (v 2 ) and either 1 envies 2 or 2 envies 1.
We call a pair of functions (p; g 0 ) 2 R R n 1 + + R R+ a simple scheme. We say that (p; g 0 ) generates the mechanism (a; t) if the scheme (p; g) de…ned by g(x) = g 0 (max x) generates (a; t): De…nition 1. A simple scheme (p; g 0 ) is a maxmed simple scheme if there exists some 2 R + such that p(x) = max (max x; ) ; g 0 (y) = med 0; y ; n 1 for all x 2 R n 1 + and y 2 R + ; where max (max x; ) denotes the maximum of the two numbers max x; ; and med 0; y ; n 1 denotes the median of the three numbers 0; y ; n 1 : A mechanism (a; t) is a maxmed mechanism if it is generated by a maxmed simple scheme.
An illustration is o¤ered in Figure 1 . When = 0; the maxmed simple scheme (p; g 0 ) of De…nition 1 is just Vickrey's second-price auction. When > 0; any mechanism generated by the scheme leaves the object unallocated at some pro…les. When the mechanism allocates the object, it does it optimally.
Let M 0 denote the subset of mechanisms in M which are individually rational.
Theorem. (i) Every maxmed simple scheme (p; g 0 ) generates at least one mechanism (a; t) 2 M 0 which is Pareto-optimal (in M). The lexicographic mechanism generated by (p; g 0 ) is such a mechanism 3 . (ii) Every mechanism (a; t) 2 M 0 which is Pareto-optimal (in M) is a maxmed mechanism.
Before establishing this result, we give an intuition for the constrained optimality of the maxmed mechanisms by showing that they are Pareto noncomparable. Contrast for instance the Vickrey mechanism (parameterized by = 0) with a nontrivial maxmed mechanism (parameterized by some positive value of ). Consider …rst a valuation pro…le v where 0 = v i < v 1 < for all i 6 = 1: The Vickrey mechanism assigns the object to agent 1 and performs no transfer. The -maxmed mechanism does not perform any transfer either but it leaves the object unallocated, an outcome dominated by the Vickrey outcome. Consider now a pro…le v 0 where n n 1 = v i < v 1 for all i 6 = 1: The Vickrey mechanism assigns the object to agent 1, charges him n n 1 ; and performs no transfer to the others. The -maxmed mechanism assigns the object to agent 1, charges him n n 1 n 1 = and performs a transfer n 1 to each of the other agents, an outcome which dominates the Vickrey outcome. By not assigning the object at low valuations pro…les, a maxmed mechanism with positive creates bene…ts for all agents at high valuations pro…les.
Proof of the theorem
Lemma 4. If (p; g 0 ) is a maxmed simple scheme and (a; t) is the lexicographic mechanism generated by (p; g 0 ), then (a; t) 2 M 0 :
Proof. This is just a matter of checking. Since (p; g 0 ) is a maxmed simple scheme, there exists 2 R + such that p(x) = max (max x; ) and g 0 (y) = med(0; y ; ) for all x 2 R n 1 + and y 2 R + : By Lemmas 1 and 2, the lexicographic mechanism (a; t) generated by (p; g 0 ) is strategy-proof, anonymous and a-feasible. It is also clear that (a; t) is individually rational. To check this, …x v 2 R 
It remains to be checked that (a; t) is t-feasible and envy-free. Fix v 2 R N + and let : N ! N be a permutation such that v (1) ::: v (n) : There are six possible cases. In all cases, the no-envy property holds among the agents who do not receive the object since all of them receive the same transfer, namely, g 0 (v (1) ): (v) ; t i (v)) = (0; 0) for all i 2 N: Hence P i2N t i (v) = 0; ensuring t feasibility. Since all agents receive the same bundle, there is no envy.
If v (1) = ; let i be the smallest i 2 N such that
) and (a i (v) ; t i (v)) = (0; 0) for all i 2 N n i : Thus P i2N t i (v) = 0; ensuring t feasibility. Agent i is indi¤erent between what he gets and what anybody else gets and since v i 0 for all i 2 N n i ; nobody envies i .
) is indi¤erent between what he gets and what anybody else gets and since v (1)
v i for all i 2 N n (1); no i 2 N n (1) envies (1):
) and (a i (v); t i (v)) = (0; n 1 ) for all i 2 N n (1): Thus P i2N t i (v) = + (n 1) n 1 = 0; satisfying t-feasibility. Since v (1) n 1 ; agent (1) does not envy any other agent and since n 1 v i for all i 2 N n (1); nobody envies (1): v i for all i 2 N n (1); nobody envies (1):
) and (a i (v); t i (v)) = (0; n 1 ) for all i 2 N n (1): Thus P i2N t i (v) = + (n 1) n 1 = 0; satisfying t-feasibility. Since v (1) n 1 ; agent (1) does not envy any other agent and, since n 1 v i for all i 2 N n (1); nobody envies (1):
v (2) 0; satisfying t-feasibility. Since v (1) v (2) + n 1 n 1 ; agent i does not envy any other agent and, since n 1 v i v (2) + n 1 for all i 2 N n i ; nobody envies (1):
Our next lemma establishes a number of properties of the mechanisms in M 0 : Notation 1. Given a simple scheme (p; g 0 ), we let (p) := inf p(x) j x 2 R n 1 + : When the reference to the scheme is clear, we write instead of (p):
Lemma 5. Let (a; t) 2 M 0 and let (p; g 0 ) be the simple scheme generating (a; t): Then, (i) for all y 2 R + ; g 0 (y) 0;
(ii) for all x 2 R n 1
Proof. For any i 2 N; de…ne e(i) 2 R n 1 + by e i (i) = 1 and e j (i) = 0 for all j 2 N n i: Ad (i). Let y 2 R + and consider the valuation pro…le v = (v 1 ; :::; v n ) = (y; :::; y): By feasibility, a i (v) = 0 for some i 2 N: By individual rationality,
Ad (ii). Let x = (x 1 ; :::; x n 1 ) 2 R n 1 + be such that p(x) > max x: By de…nition of (a; t); a n (x 1 ; :::; x n 1 ; max x) = 0 and since p is symmetric, a i (x 1 ; :::; x n 1 ; max x) = 0 for all i 2 N such that x i = max x: Since (a; t) is conditionally a-optimal (by Lemma 2), it follows that a(x 1 ; :::; x n 1 ; max x) = (0; :::; 0): By feasibility, P Fix " such that 0 < " < y (= p(y; :::; y) ): Let x " = (x " 1 ; :::; x " n 1 ) 2 R n 1 + be such that p(x " ) +": Such a point x " exists by de…nition of : Moreover, max x " < y (otherwise, p(x " ) max x " y; hence +" y; contradicting our assumption on "). Consider the valuation pro…le v " = (x " 1 ; :::; x " n 1 ; y): Since y > + " p(x " ); we have a n (v " ) = 1; hence by a-feasibility a(v " ) = e(n): By t-feasibility, (n 1)g 0 (y) + g 0 (max
Ad (iv). Let y; z 2 R + be such that y < z: Let v = (v 1 ; :::; v n ) = (z; y; :::; y): By conditional a-optimality, a(v) = (0; :::; 0) or a(v) = e(1):
If a(v) = (0; :::; 0); preventing agent 2 from envying agent 1 requires g 0 (z) g 0 (y) while preventing 1 from envying 2 requires g 0 (y) g 0 (z); hence y g 0 (y) z g 0 (z):
If a(v) = e(1); preventing 2 from envying 1 requires g 0 (z) y + g 0 (y) p(y; :::; y) and preventing 1 from envying 2 requires z +g 0 (y) p(y; :::; y) g 0 (z): If g 0 (y) > 0; then (ii) and Lemma 2(i) imply p(y; :::; y) = y and the two no-envy conditions reduce to g 0 (z) g 0 (y) and y g 0 (y) z g 0 (z): If g 0 (y) = 0; then g 0 (z) 0 = g 0 (y) holds by (i) and the second no-envy condition reduces to z p(y; :::; y) g 0 (z); hence z g 0 (z) p(y; :::; y) y = y g 0 (y); where the last inequality follows from Lemma 2(i).
Notation 2. Given a simple scheme (p; g 0 ), let X(p) = x 2 R n 1 + j p(x) = max x and (p) := inf fmax x j x 2 X(p)g : When the reference to the scheme is clear, we write instead of (p):
Observe that for any simple scheme (p;
The next lemma is the heart of the proof of our theorem.
Lemma 6. Let (a; t) 2 M 0 and let (p; g 0 ) be the simple scheme generating (a; t): For all x 2 R n 1 + let p (x) = max(max x; (p)):
Proof. By Lemma 1, (a ; t ) is a strategyproof and anonymous mechanism. By Lemma 5, g 0 is nonnegative, hence (a ; t ) is individually rational. It remains to be shown that (a ; t ) is feasible and envy-free.
Write (p) = and (p) = : By Lemma 2 (i) and the de…nition of ; p(x) max x and p(x) for all x 2 R n 1
Step 1. Proving a-feasibility. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists v 2 R N + such that, say, a 1 (v) = a 2 (v) = 1: By de…nition of (a ; t ); there are only three possible cases:
; contradicting a-feasibility of (a; t).
This proves that (a ; t ) is a-feasible. Note that it follows from Lemma 2 that (a ; t ) is also conditionally a-optimal.
Step 2. Proving t-feasibility.
Fix v = (v 1 ; :::; v n ) and assume without loss of generality v 1 ::: v n :
Let m be the largest i 2 N such that v i 1 < v i : By assumption, 1 < i n, so we have v 1 ::: v m 1 < v m = ::: = v n : Observe that for all i = 1; :::; m 1;
(To see why (4) holds, suppose there exists i m 1 such that a i (v) = 1:
Likewise, if there exists i m 1 such that a i (v) = 1; then by de…nition of (a ; t ) and (3), we have
and it follows from the de…nition of (a ; t ) that a i (v) = 1:) Now distinguish two subcases.
Case 1.1. a (v) = (0; :::; 0): Then (4) and (5) imply a(v) = (0; :::; 0): By de…nition of (a ; t );
where the last inequality holds by feasibility of (a; t): Case 1.2. a (v) 6 = (0; :::; 0):
Since (a ; t ) is conditionally a-optimal (by Step 1), there exists i 2 fm; :::; ng such that a (v) = e(i ): It follows from (4) and (5) : By de…nition of p ; p (v i 
where the …rst inequality holds because a(v) = e(i ) or a(v) = (0; :::; 0):
where the …rst inequality holds by Lemma 5 (iii) and the second by de…nition of p :
If p (v 1 ; :::; v 1 ) = p(v 1 ; :::; v 1 ); then by de…nition of (a ; t ) we have (a (v) ; 
Step 3. Proving no-envy. 
hence by de…nition of (a; t); a i (v) = 0: So a i (v) = 0 in all cases. Similarly, a j (v) = 0: By de…nition of (a ; t ), (v) and i; j do not envy each other at (a (v) ; t (v)):
By conditional a-optimality, v i v j : We …rst check that i does not envy j:
Taking these inequalities into account,
as desired.
Next we check that j does not envy i: Since a i (v) = 0; (5) implies a i (v) = 0:
where the …rst inequality holds by (3) and the second because (a; t) is envy-free.
If a j (v) = 0; then
where the …rst inequality holds because a j (v) = 1 implies v j p (v j ).
We now turn to Pareto-dominance and Pareto-optimality. We begin with an elementary result. For any set Z and any two functions f; f 
Proof. The straightforward proof is omitted.
Lemma 8. If (a; t) 2 M 0 ; then there exists a maxmed mechanism (a
Proof.
Step 1. Let (a; t) 2 M 0 and let (p; g 0 ) be the simple scheme generating (a; t): De…ne p and (a ; t ) as in Lemma 6. By Lemma 6, (a ; t ) 2 M 0 : By Lemma 7, (a ; t ) % (a; t):
Step 2. Write = (p): We claim that (n 1)g 0 (z) + g 0 (y) y for all y; z 2 R + such that y z:
To prove this claim, …x y; z 2 R + such that y z: By de…nition of p ; p (y; :::; y) = max(y; :::; y) = y: Let v = (y; :::; y; z):
If a i (v) = 0 for all i 2 N n n, feasibility of (a ; t ) implies (n 1)g 0 (z) + g 0 (y) y = (n 1)g 0 (z)+ g 0 (y) p (y; :::; y)
If a i (v) = 1 for some i 2 N nn, then by conditional a-optimality of (a ; t ) we have y = z: Feasibility of (a ; t ) then implies (n 1)g 0 (y)+g 0 (y) p (y; :::; y) 0; hence again (n 1)g 0 (z) + g 0 (y) y:
Step 3. Now let 0 = (n 1) sup fg 0 (y) j y 2 R + g and de…ne
and all y 2 R + : Let (a 0 ; t 0 ) be the lexicographic mechanism generated by the simple scheme (p 0 ; g 
By de…nition of p ; p (y; :::; y) > y for all y < . Applying Lemma 5 (ii) to (p ; g 0 ); g 0 (y) = 0 for all y < :
Finally, from (6), g 0 (y) y (n 1)g 0 (z) whenever y z
where the second implication holds because g 0 is nondecreasing (by Lemma 5 (iv)). Hence, by de…nition of 0 ;
Combining (7), (8) and (9) Proof of the Theorem. Ad (i) Let (p; g 0 ) be a maxmed simple scheme as in De…nition 1. Let (a; t) be the lexicographic mechanism generated by (p; g 0 ): By Lemma 4, (a; t) 2 M 0 :
We check that (a; t) is Pareto-optimal in M. for all x 2 R n 1 + and all y 2 R + : If = 00 , then (a 00 ; t 00 ) (a; t); contradicting (a 00 ; t 00 ) (a; t): If < 00 ; pick y; z 2 R + such that y < < 00 < z and consider the valuation pro…le v = (y; :::; y; z): Then v n a n (v) + t n (v) = z + g 0 (y) p(y; :::; y) = z > z 00 = z + g 00 0 (y) p 00 (y; :::; y) = v n a 00 n (v) + t 00 n (v); contradicting (a 00 ; t 00 ) (a; t) again. If > 00 ; pick y; z 2 R + such that n n 1 < y < z and consider the valuation pro…le v = (y; :::; y; z): Then v 1 a 1 (v) + t 1 (v) = g 0 (z) = n 1 > 00 n 1 = g 00 0 (z) = v 1 a 00 1 (v) + t 00 1 (v) ; contradicting (a 00 ; t 00 ) (a; t) again.
Ad (ii). Let (a; t) 2 M 0 be Pareto-optimal in M. By Lemma 8, there exists a maxmed mechanism (a 0 ; t 0 ) 2 M 0 such that (a 0 ; t 0 ) % (a; t): Since (a; t) is Pareto-optimal, we must have (a 0 ; t 0 ) (a; t): This proves that (a; t) is Paretoequivalent to a maxmed mechanism.
To complete the proof, we check that (a; t) is a maxmed mechanism. To see this, let (p; g 0 ) be the simple scheme generating (a; t) and let (p 0 ; g 
Discussion
No-envy is essential to our characterization. The maxmed mechanisms are generally not Pareto-optimal within the larger class of feasible, strategyproof and anonymous mechanisms. For instance, the Vickrey mechanism is Paretodominated by the mechanism described in Cavallo (2006) and previously studied in di¤erent contexts by Bayley (1997) and Porter, Soham and Tennenholtz (2004) . No-envy is redundant when n = 2: In that case, Athanasiou (2011) shows that the maxmed mechanisms are Pareto-optimal among the feasible, strategyproof and anonymous mechanisms and our theorem implies that no other individually rational mechanism is Pareto-optimal in that class.
